Behavioral Modernity and the Cultural Transmission of Structured Information: The Semantic Axelrod Model

Cultural transmission models are coming to the fore in explaining increases in the Paleolithic toolkit richness and diversity. During the later Paleolithic, technologies increase not only in terms of diversity but also in their complexity and interdependence. As Mesoudi and O'Brien (2008) have shown, selection broadly favors social learning of information that is hierarchical and structured, and multiple studies have demonstrated that teaching within a social learning environment can increase fitness. We believe that teaching also provides the scaffolding for transmission of more complex cultural traits. Here, we introduce an extension of the Axelrod (1997} model of cultural differentiation in which traits have prerequisite relationships, and where social learning is dependent upon the ordering of those prerequisites. We examine the resulting structure of cultural repertoires as learning environments range from largely unstructured imitation, to structured teaching of necessary prerequisites, and we find that in combination with individual learning and innovation, high probabilities of teaching prerequisites leads to richer cultural repertoires. Our results point to ways in which we can build more comprehensive explanations of the archaeological record of the Paleolithic as well as other cases of technological change.Comment: 24 pages, 7 figures. Submitted to "Learning Strategies and Cultural Evolution during the Paleolithic", edited by Kenichi Aoki and Alex Mesoudi, and presented at the 79th Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology, Austin TX. Revised 5/14/1

The Evolution of Facultative Conformity Based on Similarity

Conformist social learning can have a pronounced impact on the cultural evolution of human societies, and it can shape both the genetic and cultural evolution of human social behavior more broadly. Conformist social learning is beneficial when the social learner and the demonstrators from whom she learns are similar in the sense that the same behavior is optimal for both. Otherwise, the social learner's optimum is likely to be rare among demonstrators, and conformity is costly. The trade-off between these two situations has figured prominently in the longstanding debate about the evolution of conformity, but the importance of the trade-off can depend critically on the flexibility of one's social learning strategy. We developed a gene-culture coevolutionary model that allows cognition to encode and process information about the similarity between naive learners and experienced demonstrators. Facultative social learning strategies that condition on perceived similarity evolve under certain circumstances. When this happens, facultative adjustments are often asymmetric. Asymmetric adjustments mean that the tendency to follow the majority when learners perceive demonstrators as similar is stronger than the tendency to follow the minority when learners perceive demonstrators as different. In an associated incentivized experiment, we found that social learners adjusted how they used social information based on perceived similarity, but adjustments were symmetric. The symmetry of adjustments completely eliminated the commonly assumed trade-off between cases in which learners and demonstrators share an optimum versus cases in which they do not. In a second experiment that maximized the potential for social learners to follow their preferred strategies, a few social learners exhibited an inclination to follow the majority. Most, however, did not respond systematically to social information. Additionally, in the complete absence of information about their similarity to demonstrators, social learners were unwilling to make assumptions about whether they shared an optimum with demonstrators. Instead, social learners simply ignored social information even though this was the only information available. Our results suggest that social cognition equips people to use conformity in a discriminating fashion that moderates the evolutionary trade-offs that would occur if conformist social learning was rigidly applied

The GYMSSA trial: a prospective randomized trial comparing gastrectomy, metastasectomy plus systemic therapy versus systemic therapy alone

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The standard of care for metastatic gastric cancer (MGC) is systemic chemotherapy which leads to a median survival of 6-15 months. Survival beyond 3 years is rare. For selected groups of patients with limited MGC, retrospective studies have shown improved overall survival following gastrectomy and metastasectomies including peritoneal stripping with continuous hyperthermic peritoneal perfusion (CHPP), liver resection, and pulmonary resection. Median survival after liver resection for MGC is up to 34 months, with a five year survival rate of 24.5%. Similarly, reported median survival after pulmonary resection of MGC is 21 months with long term survival of greater than 5 years a possibility. Several case reports and small studies have documented evidence of long-term survival in select individuals who undergo CHPP for MGC.</p> <p>Design</p> <p>The GYMSSA trial is a prospective randomized trial for patients with MGC. It is designed to compare two therapeutic approaches: gastrectomy with metastasectomy plus systemic chemotherapy (GYMS) versus systemic chemotherapy alone (SA). Systemic therapy will be composed of the FOLFOXIRI regimen. The aim of the study is to evaluate overall survival and potential selection criteria to determine those patients who may benefit from surgery plus systemic therapy. The study will be conducted by the Surgery Branch at the National Cancer Institute (NCI), National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland. Surgeries and followup will be done at the NCI, and chemotherapy will be given by either the local oncologist or the medical oncology branch at NCI.</p> <p>Trial Registration</p> <p>ClinicalTrials.gov ID. NCT00941655</p

Rapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation

Over the past several decades, we have argued that cultural evolution can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation because it often leads to more rapid adaptation than genetic evolution, and, when multiple stable equilibria exist, rapid adaptation leads to variation among groups. Recently, Lehmann, Feldman, and colleagues have published several papers questioning this argument. They analyze models showing that cultural evolution can actually reduce the range of conditions under which cooperation can evolve and interpret these models as indicating that we were wrong to conclude that culture facilitated the evolution of human cooperation. In the main, their models assume that rates of cultural adaption are not strong enough compared to migration to maintain persistent variation among groups when payoffs create multiple stable equilibria. We show that Lehmann et al. reach different conclusions because they have made different assumptions. We argue that the assumptions that underlie our models are more consistent with the empirical data on large-scale cultural variation in humans than those of Lehmann et al., and thus, our models provide a more plausible account of the cultural evolution of human cooperation in large groups